The Duty to Defend Advertising Injuries Caused by Junk Faxes: An Analysis of Privacy, Spam, Detection and Blackmail

Walter Block,
Roy Whitehead
N. Stephan Kinsella
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WALTER BLOCK, ROY WHITEHEAD & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA*

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper deals with insurance coverage of a firm that engaged in sending out junk faxes, or spam. In part II, we offer a legal analysis of a lawsuit involving this matter. Part III is devoted to a philosophical and economic analysis of the issue.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. BACKGROUND

In the recent case of American States Insurance Company v. Capital Associates, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether there was a duty, under the terms of a policy of insurance

* Dr. Walter Block, Ph.D., Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics, College of Business Administration, Loyola University New Orleans. Roy Whitehead, JD, LL.M., Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Central Arkansas. N. Stephan Kinsella, JD, LL.M. General Counsel & VP-Intellectual Property, Applied Optoelectronics, Inc. The views expressed herein are those of the authors alone, and should not be attributed to any other person or entity.

covering advertising injuries, for the firm to defend an action filed against the insured for sending unsolicited advertising to fax machines. The case is important because it concerns an issue of first impression in the United States. The precedential authority of the opinion is greatly enhanced because its author, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, is widely regarded as an influential scholar and judge who has authored numerous scholarly articles on the right of privacy.

This case arose when the insured, Capital Associates, sent an unsolicited advertisement to the fax machine of JC Hauling. That act of the insured violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, which makes it unlawful "to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." The insurer, American States Insurance Company, had previously issued a policy to Capital Associates covering advertising injury. The aggrieved recipient of the fax, JC Hauling, filed a class action against the insured, Capital Associates, on behalf of all parties who received the junk fax. Capital Associates then tendered the claim to American States and demanded a defense under the advertisement injury coverage. American States, believing the claimed advertising injury was not covered by the policy, quickly filed a federal suit seeking a declaratory judgment from the federal court.

2. The court said "Ours is the first federal appellate decision on the subject . . . ." Id. at 943.
7. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
district court that the policy did not require either a defense or indemnity.\textsuperscript{11}

B. DISCUSSION

The policy of insurance defined an advertising injury as “[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy.”\textsuperscript{12} Another clause in the policy excluded any injury that was “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”\textsuperscript{13} In its request for declaratory judgment, American States contended that the sending of an unsolicited telephone fax does not result in an advertising injury and that even if it does, the injury caused to the receiving party is expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.\textsuperscript{14} The federal district court trial judge found that the unsolicited fax violated the corporate recipient’s right of privacy and declared that American States must defend Capital Associates.\textsuperscript{15} American States quickly appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The learned trial judge failed to enlighten the litigants with his definition of the parameters of the term “privacy” as used in the policy.\textsuperscript{16} He discussed privacy in a generic sense but failed to discuss the seclusion or secrecy interests that form the basis of Judge Easterbrook’s opinion.

Recall that the terms of the coverage concerned whether the unsolicited telephone fax violated JC Hauling’s right of privacy. Judge Easterbrook commenced the inquiry into the case by exploring the meaning of the word “privacy” as used in the policy.\textsuperscript{17} He wrote that the right of privacy is generally regarded as protecting two principal interests. They are secrecy and seclusion.\textsuperscript{18} A wish on the part of an individual to conceal a past criminal conviction, a divorce, a drug rehabilitation, his movie rental records, a bankruptcy, or a loathsome disease from business associates or social friends is asserting a secrecy-

\textsuperscript{12} Am. Sts. Ins. Co., 392 F.3d at 940.
\textsuperscript{13} Id.
\textsuperscript{14} Id.
\textsuperscript{15} Id.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 942.
\textsuperscript{17} Id. at 941.
\textsuperscript{18} Id. (citing Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights as Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 Geo. L. J. 2381 (1996)).
styled right of privacy. On the other hand, a person who wants to keep his telephone number and street address private to avoid solicitors ringing his doorbell or calling on his home telephone is asserting a privacy interest in the sense of seclusion. It is also true that it is possible to combine the two interests. For example, in two well-known cases the courts have discovered a privacy right to engage in sexual activity with a person of the same sex and to have an abortion.

American States argued that the language of its advertising coverage should be interpreted by the court to deal with a secrecy interest in privacy rather than a seclusion interest. If that is so American States is off the duty-to-defend hook because the fax to JC Hauling clearly did not disclose any embarrassing secret information about the recipient such as a long ago criminal conviction, and, as a consequence, did not trigger a duty to defend. Nor did the fax direct public attention to a true but misleading fact as in Lovgren v. Citizens First National Bank of Princeton. Judge Easterbrook said that the language of the advertisement coverage might also be read to cover improper disclosures of things such as social security numbers, credit and bank records, or other personal information that could be used to aid identity theft, citing Reno v. Condon. In Reno, the Supreme Court decided that the Commerce Clause powers of Congress allowed it to forbid states from selling personally-identifying information such as driver’s license numbers. But JC Hauling did not claim that Capital Associates published any information of that sort about it and

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19. Id. See also, Murphy supra n. 5 at 2386.
21. Id.
25. See Gates v. Discovery Commun., Inc., 34 Cal. 4th 679 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff was able to proceed with the cause of action even though the newspaper published truthful information about his criminal convictions).
26. 126 Ill. 2d 411, 418 (Ill. 1989).
the district judge did not so find.\textsuperscript{29} The district judge had merely stated, without elaborating, that the \textit{Telephone Protection Act}\textsuperscript{30} was understood to protect privacy.\textsuperscript{31} In doing so, he cited a case concerning Congress’s intent to protect the seclusion interest of telephone subscribers: \textit{International Science \\& Technology Institute, Inc. v. Inacom Communications, Inc.}\textsuperscript{32} The \textit{International Science \\& Technology} case used the term “privacy” in the sense of seclusion from a knock on the door or a ringing telephone.\textsuperscript{33} But in this case the trial judge failed to even consider the different privacy interests of secrecy and seclusion and to properly apply them to the facts of the case and the operative contractural terms of the policy.\textsuperscript{34}

On appeal, Judge Easterbrook wrote that the key issue in the case was whether the insurance policy covered the sort of seclusion privacy interest affected by faxed ads.\textsuperscript{35} He discussed two areas of inquiry that the court should consider in reaching a decision about the policy coverage. First, do corporations like JC Hauling really have an interest in seclusion?\textsuperscript{36} The court thought not. The court opined that corporations are usually open for business and that a successful business practice generally encourages telephone calls and any other communications that might alert them to all sorts of business opportunities.\textsuperscript{37} Importantly, most state and federal cases have held that corporations lack privacy interests.\textsuperscript{38} The \textit{Morton Salt} case involved a demand from the Federal Trade Commission that Morton Salt turn over a statement of “prices, terms, and conditions of sale of salt . . .”\textsuperscript{39} Morton Salt objected on Fourth Amendment grounds, claiming an expectation of privacy in the maintenance of the requested business records.\textsuperscript{40} In ruling that the federal agency could obtain the records, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that it was well-settled that

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Am. Sts. Ins. Co.}, 392 F.3d at 942.
\item\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Am. Sts. Ins. Co.}, 392 F.3d at 942.
\item\textsuperscript{32} 106 F.3d 1146 (4th Cir. 1997).
\item\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Am. Sts. Ins. Co.}, 392 F.3d at 942. \textit{See also} 106 F.3d at 1150.
\item\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Am. Sts. Ins. Co.}, 392 F.3d at 942.
\item\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Id.}
\item\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Id.}
\item\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Id.}
\item\textsuperscript{38} \textit{See, e.g., U.S. v. Morton Salt Co.}, 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
\item\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Id.} at 637.
\item\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Id.} at 651.
\end{itemize}
"corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy." Judge Easterbrook was unconvinced that JC Hauling had an expectation of privacy in this situation. A point in his favor in this regard is that one can convincingly argue that JC Hauling had less of an expectation of privacy than Morton Salt because no information of any kind was sought from JC Hauling.

Secondly, Judge Easterbrook wrote that the language of the policy strongly suggests that the coverage is limited to only a secrecy interest. This is so because the terms of the policy indicate that it covers a "publication" that violates a right of privacy. Here, the facts indicate that the unsolicited fax published no embarrassing facts or other information about JC Hauling that would violate a secrecy interest. In a secrecy situation, publication matters because it will reveal the secret information protected by the privacy interest. In a seclusion situation, publication of the private information is irrelevant because it is the unwelcome intrusion of the knock on the door or the ringing telephone that disturbs the recipient, rather than the content of the message. The unsolicited fax to JC Hauling was more analogous to seclusion privacy than to secrecy privacy interests covered by the policy. To summarize up to this point, the federal statute’s language, "to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine," prohibits the means of communicating the message, in this case the ad itself; the actual content is all but entirely irrelevant. But the advertising injury coverage spelled out in the policy, "'publication' of material 'that violates a [person's] right of privacy'" more reasonably deals with the content of the communication that might contain information that violates a secrecy interest.

So it appears fairly certain that the federal statute’s drafters and the policy of insurance intended to use the key deciding term "privacy"

41. Id. at 652.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 943 (citing 47 U.S.c. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000)).
49. Id. at 942.
in altogether different ways. The federal statute is intended to protect a seclusion interest by regulating the method of the communication of the advertisement to telephone users; it does not address its content. The American States insurance policy terms were contractually intended to cover the content of the message rather than its means of communication. The appellate court ruled that the advertising injury clause of the kind found in American States’ policy does not cover the normal consequences of junk fax advertising.

But that was not the end of the inquiry. What of the policy clause excluding harm that is “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured?” That question gave little pause to Judge Easterbrook. He quickly resolved the question about the meaning of the clause that excluded injury that “is ‘expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured,’ ” in favor of American States. He said that senders may be unclear about whether unsolicited faxes violate the federal law but they all must know that unsolicited faxes deplete the recipient’s property, such as electricity, ink and paper, consume the attention of employees and tie up fax lines. This knowledge triggers the policy’s exclusion of injury that “is expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”

The appellate court ruled that American States did not have a duty to defend Capital Associates. We think that this part of the case was properly decided.

C. CONCLUSION

So the practical question becomes: How do we deal with this drafting issue and avoid the quicksand of privacy law when writing

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50. Id. at 942-43.
51. Id. at 943.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Easterbrook states that Illinois law “requires insurers to defend when coverage is a close issue.” The court did not think this was a close issue. Id.
advertising clauses in insurance policies? Easy. We cloak our language in terms of contract rather than privacy. Recall that Judge Easterbrook’s opinion appears to be grounded in privacy law. But was it? No; we think the astute observer will notice that what Judge Easterbrook was doing, while discussing the parameters of privacy law, was really interpreting the implied contract between American States and Capital Associates.\textsuperscript{59} We believe that \textit{American States} was actually a contracts case, the terms of which dealt with privacy.

Now to turn to some backwoods-lawyer homespun advice on how to avoid this issue in the future. The best way is to draft the coverage clause in a contractual manner that spells out the particular type of privacy, secrecy and/or seclusion, and for that matter, any other interests of the insurer covered by the policy. This approach ensures that the often-confusing privacy rights issues confronted in \textit{American States} never arise. Why is this so? Because it is well settled that parties may contract away their privacy interests in voluntary contract. When the contract governs the rights and duties concerning the use of private information, the contract has been found enforceable.\textsuperscript{60} This is so because the privacy information is secured, protected, or waived in a voluntary transaction.\textsuperscript{61} Perhaps the leading case on this point is \textit{Snepp v. United States},\textsuperscript{62} involving a promise by a CIA agent not to publish any information about the Agency’s intelligence-gathering activities.\textsuperscript{63} Perhaps thinking that his information was so valuable to the public that the agreement was not enforceable, Snepp quit the CIA and published a book.\textsuperscript{64} The Supreme Court said that the agreement was enforceable and that Snepp had to give his book profits to the CIA.\textsuperscript{65} So the principles of contract law that surely apply to voluntary transactions

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{59} For more on this, see \textit{Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.}, 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-02 (N.D. Ohio 1965). Here, a physician who gave a patient’s health information to an insurance company was found liable on an implied contracts theory. \textit{Id.}
\item\textsuperscript{60} \textit{See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.}, 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (enforcing confidentiality agreement does not offend the First Amendment); \textit{see Anderson v. Strong Meml. Hosp.}, 151 N.Y. Misc. 2d 353 (1991) (breach of promise to not disclose HIV status of patient is actionable).
\item\textsuperscript{61} \textit{See generally} Steven A. Bibas, \textit{Student Author, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy}, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 591, 605 (1994) (proposing that people can voluntarily contract away privacy issues).
\item\textsuperscript{62} 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
\item\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Id.} at 507-08.
\item\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Id.} at 507.
\item\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.} at 515-16.
\end{itemize}
govern the terms of the coverage rather than the misty law of privacy. We so recommend.

III. PHILOSOPHICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This section of the paper will be devoted to a philosophical and economic analysis of several of the issues raised in the previous section. The perspective taken will be that of libertarianism. This is the view that just law consists solely of enactments requiring that no one violate the person and legitimately-owned property of anyone else. Property is first carved out of nature through homesteading, and then owes its legitimacy to any voluntary act such as trade, gifts, purchase, gambling, etc.

A. PRIVACY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

How does this philosophy impact the issue of privacy? Libertarianism asks of all acts, to determine if they should be legal: do


they constitute a per se violation of, or trespass against, person or property rights? Rights to bodily integrity may be undermined through assault and battery, murder, rape, etc. Does an interference with privacy rise to this level? It certainly need not do so. That is, it is possible to imagine numerous cases wherein a man’s privacy is ruined, but there is no uninvited border crossing against his body. For example, A tells B’s secret to C. B’s privacy has been shattered. But A has free speech rights, and since rights cannot conflict, B can have no “privacy right” as against A.

Are violations of privacy incompatible with property rights in physical possessions? That is, do they constitute theft, or trespassing, or some other such violation of property rights? Again, they may do so, but they certainly need not do so. If they violate property rights in such a manner, they would be proscribed by libertarian law not because they are incompatible with rights to privacy, of which there are none, but because they amount to theft, or trespassing.

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69. Of course, it most certainly can. Rape, murder, kidnapping, etc., are all denigrations of privacy. But these are prohibited, under libertarian law, not because they interfere with privacy, but due to the fact that they constitute attacks on one’s most important possession, one’s own body.


71. If they do, one or both is incorrect or misspecified.

72. Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty 121-22 (N.Y. U. Press 1998), (available at www.mises.org/rothbard/ethics/ethics.asp (accessed May 7, 2006)) (“It might, however, be charged that Smith does not have the right to print such a statement, because Jones has a ‘right to privacy’ (his ‘human’ right) which Smith does not have the right to violate. But is there really such a right to privacy? How can there be? How can there be a right to prevent Smith by force from disseminating knowledge which he possesses? Surely there can be no such right. Smith owns his own body, and therefore has the property right to own the knowledge he has inside his head, including his knowledge about Jones. And therefore he has the corollary right to print and disseminate that knowledge. In short, as in the case of the ‘human right’ to free speech, there is no such thing as a right to privacy except the right to protect one’s property from invasion. The only right ‘to privacy’ is the right to protect one’s property from being invaded by someone else.”) One might quibble with the wording that Smith has a right “to own . . . knowledge,” since knowledge is simply information and cannot per se be “owned.” See, e.g., N. Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 15:2 J. of Libertarian Stud. 1 (Spring 2001) (available at www.mises.org/journals/jls/15_2/15_2_1.pdf (accessed May 7, 2006)). However, it is certainly true that Smith has a right to use his body—this is what it means to own it—and since his body contains knowledge about Jones, Smith, therefore, has the corollary right to use this knowledge, e.g. to print and disseminate it, as Rothbard notes. Rothard, The Ethics of Liberty at 121-22.
Take wiretapping as a case in point. This is a crime, not based on the fact that it reduces privacy, although, certainly, it does, but because it constitutes trespassing. States Rothbard: “[N]o one has the right to burgle someone else’s home, or to wiretap someone’s phone lines. Wiretapping is properly a crime not because of some vague and woolly ‘invasion of a “right to privacy”,’ but because it is an invasion of the property right of the person being wiretapped.”

It is on the basis of considerations of this sort that we reject the court’s view that “corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.” It is not that corporations such as JC Hauling, the owners of the fax machine abused by Capital Associates, have lesser rights of privacy than private persons. No one, person or corporation, has any such “right.” Rather, Capital Associates is guilty of treading on the property rights of JC Hauling; to wit, the former caused the latter to waste paper, ink and man-hours, without permission or agreement.

This tradition of libertarianism offers a sharp contrast to that of the “Chicago School” of law and economics in their handling of privacy. In the former case, as we have seen, it is all a matter of property rights. The latter relies upon so-called “cost-benefit analysis.” How does this work? If wiretapping is at issue, the court, under the sway of this problematic philosophy, will ask not who owns the building, the wires, the connections, the telephones, etc., but rather which course of action will more greatly raise, or lower by a smaller amount, G.D.P. or social wealth. For example, if the benefit to the wiretapper is $500, and the loss to the person whose property is invaded is only $400, then the judicial nod will go to the former. If these amounts of money are reversed, e.g., the gains to the trespasser are only $400, while the cost to the property owner is $500, then the court will find the wiretapping illegal.

73. Rothbard, supra n. 73, at 122.
One problem with this way of approaching the issue is that the court cannot allocate costs to the contending parties in this manner since it cannot really have knowledge of this information. Costs are essentially foregone opportunities, and, as such, are subjective. To
be sure, there are some occasions upon which judges must make such
determinations,77 but there is simply no good reason to force them to
play this role when there is no need for it. Another difficulty, even
assuming judicial omniscience in this regard, is that property rights can
change, whenever there is an alteration in relative prices. For example,
on one day, or in one place, the benefits to the wiretapper can be $500
and the costs to the victim $400, leading to one determination. On the
next day, or on the same day in a different jurisdiction, these figures
can be reversed, implying the exact opposite finding. This would not
be a system of law; it would be the very opposite. Necessarily, there
could be no such thing as a precedent.

B. SPAM

The proper remedy, under libertarian law, would be the
imposition of criminal penalties. According to a recent newspaper
article headline, “Spammers face ‘mail fraud’ charges and 20 years in
the federal pen!”78

This might seem like a draconian sentence imposed on spammers
by federal anti-spam legislation, but it is compatible with libertarian
law. The law is clearly unconstitutional since the Constitution nowhere

77. Estimates for harm and suffering, for example.
78. Stephen Kinsella, “Spammers face ‘mail fraud’ charges and 20 years in
the federal pen!,” http://blog.lewrockwell.com/lewrv/archives/004377.html (commenting
on David Shepardson, Feds Charge 4 Under Spam Law, 1A Detroit News (Apr. 29,
2004),
(accessed May 7, 2006).
authorizes the federal government to regulate such activity. However, there is a higher law than mere federal law, and that is libertarian law. In principle, spam is a crime. As correctly found in the now-classic case of *CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.*:

[W]here defendants engaged in a course of conduct of transmitting a substantial volume of electronic data in the form of unsolicited e-mail to plaintiff’s proprietary computer equipment, where defendants continued such practice after repeated demands to cease and desist, and where defendants deliberately evaded plaintiff’s affirmative efforts to protect its computer equipment from such use, plaintiff has a viable claim for trespass to personal property . . . .

Why is this consistent with libertarianism? Because the owner of property such as a personal computer (PC) has the right to control it, which includes the right to exclude others from using it. Sending an e-mail to someone is a means of using the PC—it causes things to happen to the PC to which the owner does not consent. It is analogous to knocking on someone’s door. Normally, this is permitted by the owner, and in many contexts, this permission or license is implied by the context (e.g., a woman does not trespass if she walks on her neighbor’s sidewalk and knocks on his front door to borrow a cup of sugar). The latter’s consent for such innocuous uses of his property is implied. Yet it can be revoked: e.g., he can erect a fence or “No Trespassing” sign, or tell his neighbor she is no longer welcome on his property. If, subsequent to this, she then knocks on his door, she has committed trespass, since she is now using his property without permission.

Similarly, in the case of spamming, especially where warned not to spam, someone is using the victim’s computer without his permission; there is an implied denial of consent to send unsolicited

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79. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“regarding the commercial use of the Internet, specifically the right of an online computer service to prevent a commercial enterprise from sending unsolicited electronic mail advertising to its subscribers” *Id.* at 1017).
80. *Id.* at 1017.
81. The common law has long recognized there is implied license, or permission, to use other’s publicly-accessible property for certain lawful uses, unless the consent has been withdrawn. *See, e.g.*, Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 1999); *R. v. Evans*, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, 1996 CanLII 248 (S.C.C.); *Robson v. Hallett* [1967] 2 QB 939; *Davis v. Lisle* [1936] 2 KB 434.
commercial e-mail, just as there is implied lack of consent for a dozen people to hold an Amway meeting on a neighbor’s front lawn. If they want to hold such a meeting, they must first obtain permission from the owner.

Consider in this regard a Houston neighborhood, West University Place. It is a small, self-contained mini-city island within Houston. It is only about two square miles, with twenty acres reserved for commercial purposes, but it is fairly densely populated with approximately 13,200 families living in 5,600 homes. Unlike Houston proper, West University Place has land use zoning.

A recently-enacted West University ordinance prohibits door-to-door soliciting in several cases: too early in the day or too late, for any unregistered solicitors, or where the homeowner has a “no soliciting” sign posted. A more recent amendment provides for a “do-not-disturb list,” which lists addresses of residents who have indicated that commercial soliciting is not welcome.

Are these rules compatible with libertarianism? There can be no doubt that they are. Property owners have the right to exclude, or to permit (“license”), others to enter on or use their property. There is normally a presumption that neighbors and others with peaceful purposes in mind can walk up to your door and knock on it, e.g. to borrow a cup of sugar. They have implicit license. There is a presumption in an area based on conventional usage and tradition, etc. But anyone at any time can change this, e.g. by telling someone they are unwelcome or by posting a sign. And there is no implicit permission for Girl Scouts to knock on anyone’s door at, say, 4:00 a.m. to sell cookies; in such conditions the presumption is reversed.

85. Id.
87. Id.
This ordinance largely reflects libertarian principles. It prohibits soliciting too early or too late. It prohibits soliciting those who have made it clear they do not welcome it—they do not give permission for this use of their property (by means of a sign or signing up on a public, publicized and easily accessible list). It even makes an exception for those under fourteen years of age, because most of us would not want to keep our neighbors’ kids from coming by to ask for donations to the Little League or from selling Girl Scout cookies.

Of course, similar comments could be made about spam. If you have a publicly-accessible or known e-mail address, the presumption is that people can e-mail you to send you a message. But you could rebut it for a specific person, like someone stalking or harassing you; you could also rebut it for a specific group of people, such as those selling penis enlargement devices, Viagra, pornography or letters from Nigeria and elsewhere offering all sorts of fraudulent financial deals. This is because sending out an e-mail is a way of using another person’s computer, since the computer is negatively impacted. Therefore, you have to have permission, at least tacit, to send e-mail. Nor is there any need to sign up on a “do-not-spam” list, since the presumption should be that nobody wants any spam, unless they explicitly welcome it.

88. As the court held in \textit{CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.}, 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997), “A great portion of the utility of CompuServe’s e-mail service is that it allows subscribers to receive messages from individuals and entities located anywhere on the Internet. Certainly, then, there is at least a tacit invitation for anyone on the Internet to utilize plaintiff’s computer equipment to send e-mail to its subscribers.” \textit{Id.} at 1023-24. However, as the court recognized, this implied consent may be revoked: “On or around October 1995, CompuServe notified defendants that it no longer consented to the use of its proprietary computer equipment. Defendants’ continued use thereafter was a trespass.” \textit{Id.} at 1024.


90. For an alternative view on this matter, see Mises Economic Blog, \textit{Dissent on Spam}, http://blog.mises.org/archives/001913.asp (last updated Apr. 27, 2004).

91. States Rothbard on this: “Unfortunately, while the 1938 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 provided for at least one type of nonbinding class action, the ‘spurious class action,’ the revised 1966 rules make all class action suits binding upon the class as a whole, or rather on all those members of the class who do not specifically request exclusion. In an unprecedented step, voluntary action is now being assumed if no action is taken.” Murray N. Rothbard, \textit{Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution}, in \textit{The Logic of Action Two} 167 (Edward Elgar 1997) (originally published 1982) (available at http://www.mises.org/rothbard/lawproperty.pdf (accessed May 7, 2006)).
What about people who *like* spam, welcome it and would resist the notion that it is unwelcome? It all depends upon the starting point, or default position. We argue from analogy. Knocking on a door to sell Girl Scout cookies or a neighbor wanting to borrow sugar is acceptable, and so are their electronic counterparts with regard to initiatory faxes or e-mails, if they emanate from the equivalent of the local neighborhood kid. This would include groups of which the recipient is a member, the local church, even if he is not. But even here, a request for non-continuation should be honored. In contrast, none of the truly criminal spammers will ever respect a request for cessation. If, when Capital Associates sent an unsolicited advertisement to the fax machine of JC Hauling, and the latter requested that this not occur ever again, and the former readily complied, much, if not all, of the wind would have been taken out of the sails of this particular lawsuit. Maybe "every dog gets one bite" could be the legal order of the day.

It is common for e-mail users to receive hundreds of unwelcome e-mails per day. This is already far more than a serious problem. It is not so easy to simply delete the spam; it takes time and effort. In a fully free market, there would arise firms or institutions that would—in case there were any doubt, and there is always a gray area—publicize preferences as to whether you do, or do not, consent to receive unsolicited faxes, e-mails, even regular mail. When someone shoves a letter into a mailbox, the recipient has to dispose of it, which costs time and money. The tons per year\(^2\) of unwanted snail mail we all receive are, in effect, litter on our private property. Just as the delivery of unwanted snail mail could be viewed as trespass, so unwelcome e-mail may be seen as a type of trespass.

C. *Detectives*

Then there is the point that if we all really have a right to privacy, at one fell swoop, suddenly all private detective agencies would have to be declared illegal. For they do little more than invade privacy, wholesale. They snoop, they try to catch us in incriminating or embarrassing circumstances, they are the bane of adulterers, etc. It cannot be denied that they are the enemy of privacy, par excellence.

\(^2\) We exaggerate, but only slightly.
Yet, it would be the rare person who would want to declare all such agencies illegal, holus bolus. In this case, then, common sense is in keeping with libertarianism, since no one can show that private detectives necessarily accost persons, or invade their own space. Yes, of course, some do; but on these occasions they would be guilty of trespass, wiretapping, etc., and would be banned in a libertarian society. But they need not do these things; without them, they can still walk their appointed rounds. Surely, there are some detectives who do not violate libertarian law.

Ignore the fact that this would be the ultimate tragedy for television, movie, play and novel writers; without the hard- (or soft-) bitten detective, half of our literature would vanish. This is a mere utilitarian consideration, unworthy of mention in a serious philosophical analysis. On the other hand, would we really relish a world without Sherlock Holmes in it?

**D. Paparazzi**

What about the paparazzi? These are photographers who take pictures of movie stars, singers, athletes and politicians, etc., against the will of the latter. In a word, they destroy the privacy of these famous people. Sometimes, they hound them mercilessly, with long-range cameras, helicopters and other modern tools of their trade. Would this be illegal in the free society? Not a bit of it. For, unless the paparazzi physically accost their targets, or invade their property rights through trespass, they are guilty of no rights violation at all, in the libertarian legal code. Of course, there are some members of this guild who do precisely these things, and they would be dealt with as the criminals they are, in the free society. But not all paparazzi resort to such tactics. The guilty ones would not be imprisoned because they took pictures of the famous, or those who wish to retain their anonymity; this is not a crime. Rather, they would be incarcerated for the violations of personal and property rights they commit; for violating the libertarian principle of non-aggression against non-aggressors.

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The camera is merely the extension of the eye. If it is legal for A to look at B,\textsuperscript{94} it should be legal for the former to take a picture of the latter.\textsuperscript{95} Were this not so, it would be illegal to wear eyeglasses. A person with poor vision may not be able to see a person seeking privacy; with this provision, he may be able to do so. If the right of privacy extends so far as to dismiss the camera from legal usage against the target's will, it must also do so for eyewear. Also, if it were legal to look at B but not to photograph B, then, for A to have a memory of B's visage would be illicit. But as both conclusions are ludicrous, a veritable reductio ad absurdum, then so is the assumption.

Privatizing all sidewalks and streets\textsuperscript{96} would go a long way toward safeguarding privacy. Their owners would have to chose

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{94} There are some stone-age peopled tribes who object to their picture being taken on the ground that this will capture their souls. These people are just plain out of luck in looking for a legal remedy under libertarianism.
  \item \textsuperscript{95} A, however, may not shine a bright light at B, e.g., use a flash camera while taking the picture without permission, as this can be construed as an invasion.
\end{itemize}
between the paparazzi and the Hollywood set. If they favored the former, the latter would not patronize their establishments. Likely, at least in many cases, the owners of thoroughfares would ban unwanted photography. Think Disney World, stretched out over many streets, 

sidewalks, roads and highways. Here, at least, the rock stars and top athletes would be free of the hounding. However, unless the owners of the roadways went the extra mile, and installed large umbrellas or awnings to cover the glitterati, they would still be subject to wide angle, extra long-range cameras perched on helicopters. That is the best the free enterprise system can do on behalf of the camera shy.

E. ABORTION

The so-called right of privacy also plays out in the area of abortion. *Roe v. Wade*[^97^] was decided partially on this basis. But, as we have seen, there is no right to privacy, as such. There are only private property rights.

Does not, however, the mother have a private property right in her own body? According to Rothbard, she does. However, he says:

> [L]et us concede, for purposes of the discussion, that fetuses are human beings—or, more broadly, potential human beings—and are therefore entitled to full human rights. But what *humans*, we may ask, have the right to be coercive parasites within the body of an unwilling human host? Clearly no *born* humans have such a right, and therefore, *a fortiori*, the fetus can have no such right either.^[98^]

The principal libertarian theory in favor of the right to abortion, far from resting on a premise of *privacy*, is based on this insight. Yes, the fetus is an alive human being, but members of this category simply have no right of trespass on private property, and the private property in question belongs to the *mother*. Thus, the woman who no longer wishes to “house” the fetus within her body is under no legal obligation to do so. She may *evict*[^99^] this interloper from her “premises.” She must do so in the gentlest manner possible, for the trespasser in this case is certainly not guilty of mens rea.

[^99^]: We eschew, here, the issue of moral obligation, as being too far removed from our present concerns.
But does the mother not have an implicit contract with the fetus to maintain it with her in the usual manner? After all, A cannot legally invite B to come for a ride with him on his airplane, and, then, when the craft is 30,000 feet in the air, change his mind and insist that B leave, forthwith. We would all concede that A had an implicit legal obligation to at least try to land B safely. But this objection misses its mark. First of all, what of pregnancy resulting from rape? There can be no question of any implicit contract in such a case, as it stems from initiatory violence. Yet, if the rights of all fetuses are the same, and this particular fetus cannot rely on implicit contract, then none can. Second, for there to be an implicit contract, there must be at least two parties who consent to the matter. In the case of voluntary intercourse, at the very time it takes place, there is only the mother. Thus, the analogy fails.

It cannot be denied that the question of abortion is one of the most hotly debated, within libertarian circles. But even libertarian arguments that oppose, to one degree or another, the right to abort, do not rely upon a right to privacy. Some libertarians, for example (including the third mentioned of the present authors), have qualms about the “eviction” version of the abortion argument. In this perspective, the parents have voluntarily invited the fetus into the womb by engaging in actions that have certain natural and fully predictable consequences. Therefore, the mother, as an invitee, has a legally enforceable obligation to the fetus. Therefore, at least in the later stages of the pregnancy when it is even more obvious that the fetus is developed enough to have rights, the supposed right to evict is, in the view of this third coauthor, arguably untenable, at least if it means the death of the fetus. Consider the case where A invites B onto his houseboat for a dinner party and launches out to sea. A should not be allowed to legally “evict” B while still far away from shore. The boat owner should be legally constrained to wait until he reaches the dock before he can force the passenger to leave. Likewise, or so the argument goes, the mother has invited the fetus into her womb and cannot evict it until it is safe to do so.

In response to the pro-abortion argument outlined above, perhaps the rights of all fetuses are not the same—it could be that mothers who voluntarily procreate have obligations to the fetus that rape victims do

101. This argument ignores the rights of the father, focusing instead on the supposed implicit contract between the fetus and the mother.
not. As for the point that there cannot be an implicit contract between the mother and the not-yet-existent fetus, it could be responded that the anti-abortion argument does not assume there is a contract between the mother and fetus, but rather an obligation that arises due to an action. If A pushes B into the lake, A incurs a positive obligation to rescue B, not because of any contract, but as a consequence of violating B’s rights, and placing B in a position of peril. It could also be noted that there is no special problem in the fact that the obligation is to a rights-bearing being that comes into existence only after the action that gives rise to the obligation. For example, suppose A plants a landmine under a rarely traveled path within view of his kitchen window, maliciously aiming to simply hurt any random person. Every morning A sips his coffee in his kitchen, waiting for some passerby to be killed. One morning ten years later, a five-year old girl is injured. A’s act of planting the bomb was done before the girl existed, but it was certainly a wrongful act that gives rise to obligations to a person who did not even exist when the action was committed.

In any event, as can be seen, the anti-abortion argument sketched here, like the pro-abortion rights argument, does not rely upon any notion of a right to privacy. Rather, it is focused on property rights in bodies and on what responsibility one incurs by virtue of voluntary actions. This libertarian inquiry has nothing to do with “privacy rights.”

Thus, as can be seen, both pro- and anti-abortion arguments can be made from the libertarian perspective without relying on the notion of privacy rights.

F. BLACKMAIL

Blackmail, too, raises issues of privacy, for this is precisely what the perpetrator of this act is threatening, if he is not paid off for holding his silence. Based on the view that privacy is a right, it follows ineluctably that blackmail should be legally prohibited.

However, the libertarian analysis of this act is very different; indeed, diametrically opposite to the usual one. Here, a very sharp distinction is drawn between blackmail and extortion. Both couple threats with a demand for money or other benefits (typically, sexual services), but that is where the resemblance ends. For in the case of extortion, what is threatened are acts which are patently illegal and should be illegal—to kill, to kidnap, to commit arson, etc. In contrast,
the threat involved in blackmail is to do something which not only is legal, but which ought to be legal; namely the threat to reveal a secret, or, in a word, gossip about a person.

No one, not even the most fervent advocate of privacy "rights," ever proposed to make gossip a criminal offense. Gossip may well be objected to on moral grounds, but never on legal grounds. But if it is not against the law to gossip, why should it be against the law to threaten to gossip? And, given that this is all that blackmail is, where is the case for its continued illegality?

IV. Conclusion

Given that the “right of privacy” has been enshrined by the courts and Congress, it is understandable that private contracts would tend to employ these concepts from time to time. Nevertheless, as the controversy in this case demonstrates, relying on artificial, non-reality-based, state-invented concepts like “the right of privacy”—which strangely includes both secrecy and seclusion interests—leads only to ambiguity, confusion and uncertainty. This obviously undercuts the very purpose of the contract—to accurately reflect the parties’ will and understanding.

A libertarian property-rights centered view of matters shows that spam is simply another form of trespass. By employing these more rigorous, unambiguous property concepts and avoiding inherently vague, artificial legal concepts, contracts can be clearer and more predictable.
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